
| Summary & Core Thesis Critical thinking in architecture: origins, growth, and influence examines how critical thinking entered the profession, what it changed in practice, and how much benefit it created. It is a companion to Critical Thinking: What It Is, Where It Came From, and What It Checks. The present article shifts the question from the general history and definition of critical thinking to its architectural consequences. |
Introduction
Here, critical thinking is treated as a working practice rather than as a general intellectual virtue. It consists of five checks: checking assumptions, evaluations, decision making, processes, and problem solving. Assumptions concern what a project takes to be true about users, materials, climate, construction, cost, or regulation. Evaluations concern how options and outcomes are judged. Decision making concerns the grounds on which one option is selected over another. Processes concern whether the sequence and coordination of work support reliable decisions. Problem solving concerns how difficulties are framed, tested, revised, and resolved. These checks overlap in practice, but they identify different points at which architectural reasoning can be made visible and questioned.
The distinction matters because architecture rarely operates through a single act of judgment. A project moves through briefs, concepts, analyses, drawings, models, approvals, procurement, construction, and occupation. At each stage, decisions depend on information that may be incomplete, interpreted differently, or carried forward without renewed examination. Critical thinking therefore concerns both the quality of individual reasoning and the arrangements that allow reasoning to be reviewed, recorded, and revised.
The article asks three linked questions: how did critical-thinking ideas enter architecture, how did they spread from individual habits into professional and educational procedures, and what did they deliver? The first question concerns the routes by which design reasoning became more explicit and testable, including intellectual developments, institutional requirements, and pressure from failure and performance evidence. The second concerns the routines through which checking became distributed across projects rather than left to private diligence. The third asks what can be supported by available evidence, distinguishing documented costs of unexamined decisions from documented gains associated with review, evaluation, research, and coordination.
This structure also limits the claim. The article does not assume that the presence of a checking procedure proves better architecture, nor does it infer a profession-wide benefit from isolated successes. It follows the five checks through architecture’s origins, growth, and influence, and closes by asking whether the systems used to check architectural decisions are themselves adequately examined.
1. How Critical Thinking Entered Architecture
| Origins & Structural Pathways Critical thinking entered architecture through three connected routes. The first was intellectual: developments in design reasoning made assumptions, alternatives, and design arguments more open to examination. The second was institutional: education and accreditation requirements, together with independent design review, carried expectations of explicit reasoning into architectural training and practice. The third arose from pressure within the profession. Building failures exposed the consequences of unchecked decisions, while performance evidence created stronger reasons to test whether buildings achieved their intended results. The subsections that follow trace these routes through the design methods movement, wicked problems and argumentative design, reflection in the studio, education and accreditation, independent review, and failures alongside evidence-based design. Together, they show how critical thinking moved from a general intellectual concern into architectural settings. |
The article traced critical thinking from Socrates and Dewey to its formal definitions in the late twentieth century. Architecture adopted it later, through several interconnected developments that reflect the checks in the article’s definition.
1.1 The Design Methods Movement
The design methods movement emerged around the 1962 Conference on Design Methods in London, bringing together engineering, industrial design, architecture and communications (Jones & Thornley, 1963). Its leading figures included J. Christopher Jones, L. Bruce Archer, Christopher Alexander and Horst Rittel. Early texts included Alexander’s Notes on the Synthesis of Form (1964) and Jones’s Design Methods (1970); the Design Research Society followed in 1966 (Langrish, 2016). The movement sought to replace reliance on intuition and the authority of the master designer with explicit, checkable reasoning.
By the 1970s, however, Alexander and Jones had rejected some of the over-rational methods they helped develop (Cross, 2001). Their self-criticism illustrates double-loop learning: questioning the assumptions behind a method, not merely correcting errors within it (Argyris, 1977).
1.2 Wicked Problems and Argumentative Design
Rittel and Webber (1973) described planning problems as “wicked”: they have no definitive formulation or stopping rule, and their solutions are judged good or bad rather than true or false. The concept applies to architecture, where briefs are often incomplete and proposed solutions can change how a problem is understood.
Rittel also treated design as an argumentative process. His issue-based information system (IBIS) recorded the questions, positions and arguments in a discussion (Kunz & Rittel, 1970). Both ideas support critical thinking through problem-framing, assumption checking and the open comparison of alternatives. Rittel and Webber’s original argument concerned planning and policy as well as design; its application to architecture is therefore an extension.
1.3 Reflection and the Design Studio
In The Reflective Practitioner, Schön (1983) challenged the view that professionals simply apply scientific techniques to given problems. He argued that they must first define the problem and then reflect both during and after action. His later work presented the architectural studio as a setting for this learning, where drawings, desk crits and reviews expose reasoning to scrutiny (Schön, 1985; 1987).
Critique is not automatically effective, however. Anthony’s Design Juries on Trial (1991) showed how power imbalances can turn a jury into an ordeal rather than an inquiry. A review controlled solely by the critic may provide a check in form but not in substance.
1.4 Education and Accreditation
Accreditation embeds expectations of critical thinking in architectural education. In the United States, NAAB’s 2009 Conditions included a realm titled “Critical Thinking and Representation.” Its criteria required students to ask precise questions, consider different viewpoints, reach reasoned conclusions, test alternatives and assess information to support their decisions (NAAB, 2009). Current Conditions are organised differently but still require integrated decisions balancing user needs, regulations, site conditions and environmental performance (SCI-Arc, n.d.). Requirements vary by country.
The UK picture is weaker in building performance evaluation. A 2018 review found that RIBA validation criteria addressed user needs and building impacts only generally, and that few programmes routinely taught evaluation (Stevenson, 2019).
1.5 Independent Design Review
Design review provides an institutional check before a scheme is fixed. In England, its lineage runs from the Royal Fine Arts Commission, founded in 1924, to the Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment (CABE), established in 1999. CABE’s guidance called for reviews to be independent, expert, multidisciplinary, transparent, timely and objective, among other principles (Carmona, Clarke & Giordano, 2018; Design Council CABE et al., 2013).
After CABE’s public funding ended in 2011, the 2012 National Planning Policy Framework endorsed design review; by 2018, around thirty formal panels operated in London alone. The process gives critical thinking an institutional form: an independent panel challenges a scheme’s assumptions while changes are still possible, and the design team records its response.
1.6 Failures and the Need to Check
Three cases show how failures—or the risk of failure—have exposed weaknesses in checking. The first two concern structural engineering, but also raise questions for architects about who checked a design change and on what information:
- Citicorp Center, New York (1978). Questions raised by students about the tower’s response to diagonal winds contributed to a reassessment by structural engineer William LeMessurier. He found that a construction change from welded to bolted joints had increased the structure’s vulnerability, and the joints were reinforced while the building remained occupied (Morgenstern, 1995). A later NIST reassessment found the wind loads less severe than first estimated, leaving the necessity of the retrofit open to debate. The process lesson remains: a consequential check went beyond the minimum code case.
- Hyatt Regency, Kansas City (1981). Two suspended walkways collapsed, killing 114 people and injuring 216. A revised rod arrangement had been approved without recalculating its loads; the original detail was also inadequate. The collapse became an example of a design change accepted on trust rather than verified (Marshall, Pfrang et al., 1982).
- Grenfell Tower, London (2017). The fire killed 72 people. The Inquiry’s 2024 Phase 2 report found that Studio E, the lead architect for the refurbishment, failed to recognise that the specified cladding was combustible or check that the external wall met fire-safety requirements. It attributed this partly to a lack of rigour in addressing gaps in the firm’s knowledge (Grenfell Tower Inquiry, 2024). The earlier Hackitt Review called for clearer responsibilities, a “golden thread” of information and checks at key stages; the Building Safety Act 2022 took these recommendations forward for higher-risk buildings (Hackitt, 2018).
1.7 Evidence-Based Design and Post-Occupancy Evaluation
Evidence-based design adds a further check: comparing design expectations with observed outcomes. Ulrich’s 1984 hospital study matched 23 pairs of patients recovering from gallbladder surgery and found that those with views of trees had shorter stays, fewer negative nurses’ notes and took fewer strong analgesic doses than those facing a brick wall. The study used existing records rather than random assignment, but became influential in evidence-based hospital design (Ulrich, 1984). Reviews subsequently documented a growing research base, although relatively few studies were randomised controlled trials (Rubin, Owens & Golden, 1998; Ulrich et al., 2004; 2008; Center for Health Design, 2014).
Post-occupancy evaluation (POE), part of wider building performance evaluation, compares a completed building’s actual performance with its requirements and captures lessons for future projects. RIBA added feedback to its Plan of Work in 1965, removed it in 1973 and restored it as the “In Use” stage in 2013. BSRIA’s Soft Landings framework also calls for evaluation after handover, although a 2018 review found limited evidence of results from the government policy (Stevenson, 2019).
Hicks (n.d.) in the AIA’s Architect’s Handbook of Professional Practice, describes a cycle of questioning, gathering evidence, testing a hypothesis, evaluating outcomes and sharing lessons. He also warns that evidence-based design can become rhetoric when intuition, precedent or manufacturers’ claims are presented as research. The approach is proportionate and optional, but a project cannot claim evidence-based design as an influence or outcome without using it.
2. Growth: From Habit to Procedure
| Cross-Disciplinary Context Critical thinking across fields: Growth Critical thinking has grown from a concern of educators into a skill that many fields now claim. In a bibliometric study covering 2017 to 2026, Juddin et al. (2026) found that publications on critical and creative thinking rose from roughly 85,000 documents in 2017 to more than 200,000 in 2025. They also found that the research is no longer confined to education. Among its most cited outlets are journals in psychology, public health, sustainability and computing, so the topic now crosses disciplines. The authors link this spread to several pressures. International bodies such as the World Economic Forum and the OECD now treat analytical and creative thinking as core skills for a workforce facing rapid technological change, and the OECD assessed creative thinking in PISA for the first time in 2022. Education systems built these skills into curricula and assessment, and the move to digital and AI-supported learning after COVID-19 opened a new line of research. The topic’s strongest link is to the Sustainable Development Goals, mainly Quality Education, with Good Health and Well-being second, which ties it to decision-making in health as well as to sustainability. The authors read these skills as complementary: critical thinking evaluates evidence and arguments, creative thinking generates alternatives, and complex problems in any field need both. This evidence shows rising attention and the authors’ explanation of it, not proof that teaching critical thinking improves outcomes. Architecture followed the same path on a smaller scale, though less as a named subject than as a set of procedures: independent review, stage gates with a feedback stage, research-informed briefing and coordination checks. |
Across fields, the broader account presented here treats critical thinking as a practice that can move beyond individual judgement and become part of organised work. In architecture, this shift changed checking from a private virtue into procedures that distribute responsibility, record decisions, and create opportunities for feedback across a project. The following discussion traces that movement from its wider development to its architectural application. It then brings the five checks into a practice-based table, showing how assumptions, evaluations, decision making, processes, and problem solving were translated into recurring project routines.
From Private Virtue to Project procedure
2. 1 What changed in practice
The main effect was to turn a private virtue into procedure. A diligent individual had always been expected to check the work, but the failures above showed that individual diligence was not reliable when responsibility was split between architects, engineers, fabricators and regulators.
Table 1 , practice change and the idea behind it , example from practice
| Practice change | Idea behind it | Example |
| Independent checking of design changes | Decision making: no change is accepted on trust. | Hyatt Regency: licence sanctions and lasting attention to responsibility for shop-drawing review. |
| Analysis beyond code minimums | Assumptions: the code case may not be the critical case. | Citicorp: the New York code did not explicitly address diagonal winds, and the check went beyond it. |
| Studio critique and design review | Reflection in action and on action; independent challenge. | Schön’s studio; CABE-style review panels. |
| Stage gates with a feedback stage | Processes and evaluation. | RIBA Stage 7 and Soft Landings; Building Safety Act gateways for higher-risk buildings. |
| Research-informed briefing | Evaluations: decisions rest on evidence about use. | Evidence-based healthcare design: single-bed rooms, ventilation, acoustics, views of nature (Ulrich et al., 2008). |
| Coordination checks in digital models | Processes: find conflicts before site. | BIM clash detection and resolution. |
Two of these deserve a closer look. Evidence-based briefing changes what a design team asks before it draws: instead of assuming that a feature helps, the team looks for research on whether it does. Clash detection in building information models is meant to find conflicts between services, structure and architecture before they reach the site, so the check happens when changing a decision is cheap.
2.2 The five checks applied to architecture
The article’s definition can be read as five questions that architects ask, or fail to ask, at different points in a project.
Table 2 , my definition five checks applied to architecture with example from practice
| Element of the definition | Question in architectural practice | Example |
| Assumptions | Which loads, users and conditions did we assume, and were they tested? | Citicorp: only the code-required wind direction was checked. |
| Evaluations | Does the building perform as predicted and as the client intended? | Post-occupancy and building performance evaluation; the performance gap. |
| Decision making | Who checked this change, and on what information? | Hyatt Regency: a telephone approval of a fabricator’s rod change. |
| Processes | Does the workflow include independent checks and a feedback stage? | Design review; RIBA Stage M (1965), dropped in 1973 and restored as Stage 7 (2013); Building Safety Act gateways. |
| Problem solving | Are we solving the right problem, and its cause? | Wicked problems; Pruitt-Igoe and defensible space (Section 3.3). |
3. Influence: What It Delivered
| Evaluating Documented Impact The account now turns from how critical thinking was institutionalised to what its use has delivered in practice. Because no single profession-wide benefit is measured, this section separates four questions: the documented costs of failing to check, documented gains where checking has been applied, limits in the available evidence, and cases that test architectural theories themselves. These strands are held together by the relation between checking as a procedure and the consequences attributed to it. The discussion then moves from specific evidence to its scope, ending with an evidence-at-a-glance table. |
3.1 What the Costs of Not Checking Show
No study measures the benefit of critical thinking across the whole of architecture, and the idea does not lend itself to a single measure. What exists is evidence about specific practices, and its quality varies. The sections below separate what is well documented from what is claimed.
The clearest evidence is about failure. Hyatt Regency cost 114 lives, and the licensing proceedings traced the failure to an unchecked change. The Grenfell Inquiry found that an architect who did not check what it specified bears a very significant share of responsibility for a disaster that killed 72 people. At Citicorp the check led to a physical repair, although NIST’s later view that the original risk was lower is a reminder that such estimates carry uncertainty.
A quieter cost shows up in building performance. The PROBE studies of the 1990s found that actual energy use was typically about twice the design estimates (Bordass et al., 2001), and a review of 64 non-domestic projects found measured demand averaging 34% above modelled values, with wide scatter (van Dronkelaar et al., 2016). The gap has several causes beyond design, including construction quality, commissioning and operation, so the design team cannot be blamed for all of it. Inadequate design-stage assumptions are, however, one of the recurring causes, and catching them is what an evaluation loop is for.
3.2 Where Benefits Are Documented
- Evidence-based healthcare design. The research base grew from 84 studies in 1998 to more than 1,200 in 2008, and findings now inform briefs and standards. The founding 1984 study used a small matched sample. A critical essay argues that the movement is partly a repackaging of older ideas and that its advocates usually stop short of claiming that architecture cures disease, with the benefits lying in stress, satisfaction, safety and similar outcomes (Theodore, 2016).
- Building performance evaluation. The PROBE studies (1995-2002) were the first systematic attempt to document the performance of new non-domestic buildings in the UK, using twenty case studies. The £17 million Retrofit for the Future programme (2009-2013, 86 homes) demonstrated a significant gap between predicted and measured energy performance. Evaluation findings from a related project substantially influenced the house types of three of the largest UK housebuilders, and Architype Architects now builds evaluation costs into every project after its own studies changed its practice (Stevenson, 2019).
- Design review. A 2017 study of London panels, based on in-depth interviews with applicants, designers, panellists and panel managers, found that participants generally judged that review improved design outcomes and was good value; the average fee was about £3,670 (Carmona, Clarke & Giordano, 2018). The evidence is perceptual. An Australian commentator wrote in the same period that evidence of impact was largely anecdotal (Keniger, 2017).
- Digital coordination. One cost-benefit study of BIM-enabled clash detection estimated savings of about 20% of contract value on a single major infrastructure project. The figure is an estimate built from a schema that costed clashes left unresolved before site work, and the project was not a building, so it is an indication of what the check can be worth, not a general rate (Chahrour et al., 2021).
3.4 Where the Benefit Is Limited
- Good practice is often not done. In 2015 only 9% of RIBA-registered practices offered post-occupancy evaluation as a fee-paying service, and none of that offer was taken up (Hay et al., 2017, cited in Stevenson, 2019). The RIBA’s own 2014 review highlighted that reported barriers include lack of leadership, collaboration and cost, and the review argues that without mandates the costs fall on design teams and evaluation will not become routine.
- The profession’s own guidance sets a voluntary bar and assumes the hardest steps. The AIA Handbook treats evidence-based design as optional, and it assumes that architects are familiar with post-occupancy evaluation and willing to publish their data. It concedes that architects are not used to releasing data, whether from fear of exposing unwelcome conclusions or to protect a competitive edge or client confidentiality (Hicks, n.d.). Stevenson’s finding that 9% of practices offered post-occupancy evaluation suggests the familiarity is optimistic too. The AIA’s 2020 firm survey found evidence-based design practices in 33% of large firms, 17% of mid-sized firms and 6% of small firms, and research budgets in 17% of large firms against 2% of the rest (Russo, 2021); the RIBA’s 2014 review likewise found that the value of research is widely accepted but significant barriers remain (RIBA, 2014). The Handbook’s own examples show where the approach concentrates: building types where outcomes are already measured, such as hospitals, schools and retail, and areas where furniture manufacturers lead the research, which is the kind of source its own warning about manufacturers’ data applies to.
- Checks can become ritual. The article’s warning that a process can look orderly while the thinking inside it is not critical applies directly. A review stage signed without scrutiny repeats the Hyatt pattern, and design review itself depends on the design team engaging with it and on decision makers being willing to withhold approval until the panel’s concerns are met (Carmona, Clarke & Giordano, 2018).
- Evidence is mostly case-based or perceived. Most of the quantified examples above are single buildings, single programmes, before-and-after comparisons or participants’ own judgements, so they show that checks can help, not how much they help on average.
- Some reforms are too recent to judge. The Building Safety Act 2022 and the Grenfell recommendations are the clearest attempt to make checking mandatory, but their effect on outcomes cannot yet be measured.
3.3 Where Critical Thinking Is Needed to Check the Theory Itself
Pruitt-Igoe in St Louis shows the same discipline applied to architecture’s own ideas. When the first buildings were demolished in 1972, critics read the failure as the failure of modern architecture, and Charles Jencks (1977) famously dated its death to the demolition. Katharine Bristol (1991) argued that the story that design caused the failure was a myth: the project’s problems grew from the economic and political conditions of postwar St Louis and from housing policy, and each retelling in the architectural press added distortions.
Oscar Newman’s Defensible Space (1972), published the year the first Pruitt-Igoe building came down, made a related argument: that the high-rise “tower in a park” failed to create spaces residents would protect. Historians such as Greg Umbach have called this simplistic environmental determinism. They point out that the theory overlooked job losses, changing tenant populations and poor management, and that in his Brooklyn comparison Newman ignored a much higher youth-to-adult ratio in the high-rise project. Newman later concluded that tenant policies mattered more than architecture, and a 1999 study of New York City Housing Authority data found that poverty rates were the main predictor of crime. Yet the earlier theory had been used to justify the HOPE VI programme, in which at least 50,000 public housing units were never replaced (Blumgart, 2015; Newman, 1972). In the article’s terms, this is an untested causal assumption (Brookfield, 2012) with large consequences, which is the strongest argument for the habit of checking.
3.6 A Worked Example from Practice: Critical Thinking in a Conversation About a Fire
The five checks can be seen at work in a conversation between two people after a high-rise fire in the UK of the kind the Grenfell Inquiry examined: an architect who consults on fire-safe design, and a member of the public who watched the fire. The exchange is illustrative, a composite constructed for this article and not a record of real people. The observer begins with a confident view: if the standards for alarms, sprinklers and materials are followed, no fire will happen, and when one does the person who did wrong is to blame. The consultant’s first reply argues with that conclusion, which is the wrong order; the observer points this out, and the consultant asks why they hold the view.
The answer is experience: in two and a half years living in the UK the observer saw no alarms in corridors, no sprinklers and no heat detectors in flats. The consultant treats this as evidence and checks it against the rules. Part of it holds: blocks designed on a “stay put” principle do not normally have communal alarms, and in England the height above which sprinklers are expected in new blocks of flats was cut from 30 m to 11 m only in November 2020 (MHCLG, 2020). Part of it needs qualifying: the standard for domestic fire detection calls for heat detection in kitchens (BSI, 2019), Wales already requires sprinklers in new flats, and the observer’s experience, though real, covers particular buildings.
The consultant then asks who is responsible if a tenant leaves a gas hob on and it ignites, and separates ignition from outcome. The tenant’s act explains how the fire started, but whether it kills depends on detection, suppression, containment, escape routes and the fire service’s response, each of which has a different owner. The Grenfell Inquiry shows why the checking must reach the evidence behind a rating: it found that manufacturers had manipulated tests and that certificates were misleading (Grenfell Tower Inquiry, 2024).
The conversation applies each of the article’s five checks. It tests an assumption (that following standards guarantees safety), evaluates evidence (the observer’s experience against the rules), questions a decision (who decided what, and on what information), examines a process (the layers of protection) and looks for a cause, not only a culprit. It also shows the limits of the method. The error in the consultant’s first reply was caught only because the observer asked, which supports the article’s point that the habit of checking comes before the technique.
Finally, critical thinking reached architecture as a set of habits and procedures more than as a named subject: argue the problem openly, reflect in the studio, submit the design to independent review, check every change, test the building against what was promised, and question the theories the profession relies on. The strongest evidence of benefit is negative, in the failures that followed when checks were missing, and the positive evidence is real but case-based. The article’s closing point fits the profession well: checking is a skill that must be practised, and the checks themselves, from the code minimum to the review stage to the theory behind a housing policy, need checking too.
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